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LABOR RELATIONS-FEDERAL -COURT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST CONcERTED STRIKE AcnVy: NoRRIS-LAGuADIA AND TAFr-HA TLy

ACCOMMODATm-Boys Markets, Ine. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Employer and Union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement in which Union had promised not to strike1 and each had prom-

ised to submit to binding arbitration at the request of the other.' A
dispute arose,3 and Union, in spite of the agreement, called a strike

and began picketing Employer's building. After attempting unsuccessfully to invoke the grievance and arbitration procedures specified in

the agreement, Employer obtained a temporary restraining order forbidding continuation of the strike

1.

Union then removed the case to the

The relevant portion of the agreement provided as follows:

D. POWERS, LIMITATIONS AND RESERVATIONS
2. Work Stoppages. Matters subject to the procedures of this Article shall be
settled and resolved in the manner provided herein. During the term of this Agree-

ment, there shall be no cessation or stoppage of work, lockout, picketing or boycotts,
except that this limitation shall not be binding upon either party hereto if the other
party refuses to perform any obligation under this Article or refuses or fails to abide
by, accept or perform a decision or award of an arbitration or board.
Boys Markets v. Retail Clerk's Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 239 n.4 (1970).
2. The agreement further provided:
ARTICLE XIV
ADJUSTMENT AND ARBITRATION
A. CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR DISAGREEMENT
Any and all matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement of any kind or
character existing between the parties and arising out of or in any way involving
the interpretation or application of the terms of this Agreement . . . [with certain
exceptions not relevant to the instant case] shall be settled and resolved by the
procedures and in the manner hereinafter set forth.

B. ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE.
C. ARBITRATION.

1. Any matter not satisfactorily settled or resolved in Paragraph B hereinafter shall
be submitted to arbitration for final determination upon written demand of either
party ....
4. The arbitrator or Board of arbitrators shall be empowered to hear and determine the matter in question and the determination shall be final and binding upon
the parties, subject only to their rights under law ....
398 U.S. at 238-39 fi.3.
3. The frozen foods supervisor in one of plaintiff's supeimarkets, along with certain
members of his crew who were not union members, began one day to rearrange merchandise in the frozen food cases. The union complained, insisting that the food cases be
stripped of all merchandise and restocked by union personnel. Plaintiff refused. Id. at 239
(1970).
4. The court also issued- an brdei, to the union to show cause why -apreliminary
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federal district court and moved to quash the state court's restraining
order. Employer, in opposition, moved for an order compelling arbitration and prohibiting further strike activity. The district court found
that the dispute was arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement, that the strike constituted a breach of contract, and that Employer was undergoing irreparable injury. On these grounds, the lower
court issued the orders Employer had requested. The court of appeals
reversed,5 relying on the United States Supreme Court's earlier decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,' and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 7 Overruling Sinclair, the Court reversed and remanded the case with directions to enter a judgment affirming the order of the district court. 8 Held: The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not
prevent a federal court from enjoining a strike over a grievance which
both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate. Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). 9
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

When Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act'0 in 1932, it drew
the curtain on more than a third of a century" of "government by ininjunction should not be granted. Id. at 240. Reproductions of the records of both the
California superior court and the federal district court may be found in the Appendix to
the Brief for Petitioner. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at app., Boys Markets Inc.
v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
5. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 416 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.
1969).
6. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
7. 396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
8. Boys Markets was a 5-2 decision. The majority included the three dissenting
justices in Sinclair, Brennan, Harlan, and Douglas, plus Justice Stewart and Chief Justice
Burger (whose predecessor, Chief Justice Warren, had voted with the majority in
Sinclair). Justice Stewart also had voted with the majority in Sinclair and was the only
member of the Court to change his mind about the correctness of the earlier result.
Justice Blackmun did not take office until June 9, eight days after the case was decided,
and Justice Marshall did not participate. This situation caused Justice Black to remark
(in a dissent joined by Justice White), "[n]othing in the language or history of the two
Acts has changed. Nothing at all has changed, in fact, except the membership of the
Court and the personal views of one Justice. I remain of the opinion that Sinclair was
correctly decided ...." Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 256.
9. At the time the research for this Note was completed, Boys Markets had been
noted in the following publications: 35 ALBANY L. Rav. 410 (1971); 37 BROOKLvi L.
Rav. 214 (1970); 9 DUQuEsNE L. REv. 328 (1970); 39 FORDrAm L. Rav. 143 (1970);
48 J. URB. LAW 525 (1971); 21 MERcFR L. Rv. 703 (1970); 41 Miss. L. Rv. 626
(1970); 49 N.C.L. REv. 386 (1971); 2 SETON HALL L. REv. 127 (1970); 22 S.C.L. REv.
849 (1970); 5.Surs'OLx U.L. REv. 319 (1970);16 Vi.L. L. RV.176 (1971); 79 Yix
L.J. 1593 (1970).
10. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
11. The famous Pullman strike in 1894 occasioned the Supreme Court's first oppor-
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junction."'1 2 Section 4 of the Actj simply stated, prohibited- tht federal
courts from issuing injunctions against participation in a labor dispute 1 3 Union strength grew so- dramatically during the next decade,
however, that soon not -labor but management found itself in need of
federal legislation to restore a balance of power. Specifically, measures
were needed to bind the parties to their promises 'made in collective
bargaining contracts.' 4 Congress responded in 1947 by passing the
Taft-Hartley Act, 6 section 301 of which confers broad jurisdiction
tunity to review the validity of a labor injunction. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). The
Court affirmed the issuance of an injunction of more than 800 words by a federal court,
on the grounds "that the jurisdiction of courts to interfere in such matters by injunction
is -one recognized from ancient times and by- indubitable authority. ' Id. at 599. This
"indubitable" and "ancient" authority was derived from cases involving equitable jurisdiction over nuisances. F. FRANxPURTER & N. GPME, TnE LABOR INJ xCTION 20 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as FRANxxuRTER & GRFm].
12. Federal courts first came to be allied. with employers-and abuse flourishedduring the period following the decision in*Swift'v: Tyioh, 41-U.S. (16 -Pet:) 1 (1842),
when state decisional law was not considered binding upon federal courts. FRixr-Rim
& GRE=N, supra note 11, at 11-17.
13. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides, in part:
No Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved -in, any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving
fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize in promotion of their interest
in a labor dispute.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
14. The Senate report accompanying the Taft-Hartley Act makes this clear. "Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable contract
is a logical and necessary step. It will piomote a higher-degree of responsibility upon the
parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote *ndustrial peace." S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 17-18 (1947).
The need for a federal cause of 'action developed because' state courts often found
themselves hamstrung in labor disputes. "[TIhe courts of many states could provide only
imperfect relief because of rules of local law which made suits against labor organizations
difficult or impossible, by reason of their status 'as unincorporated- associations." Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 510 (1962).
15. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
Section 151 provides in part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate *the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and *to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when-they have occurred' by encouraging the practice and pro-cedure of collective bargaining ....-
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upon the federal courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements
against either party. 6
The first question presented by section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act
was fundamental: in suits brought under that section, should a federal
court apply state law or federal law? Speaking for the Supreme Court
in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,17 Justice Douglas announced the historic result: 18
[T] he substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor laws.
The Court's decision, which affirmed a federal district court's order
requiring the employer to specifically perform his promise to arbitrate,' 9 rested primarily ° upon one assumption:-"
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid
pro quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the

16. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides, in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the Uinted States. Any money judgment against
a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable
only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
17. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Three members of the Court thought § 301(a) was purely
procedural, including Justice Frankfurter, who argued that the section was therefore
unconstitutional "in cases such as the present one where it provides the sole basis for
exercise of jurisdiction by the federal courts." Id. at 484.
18. Id. at 456.
19. The Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prohibit a federal court
from compelling the arbitration of a labor dispute, because the "failure to arbitrate was
not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed." Id. at 458.
20. The majority also argued that § 301(a) would be redundant under a contrary
interpretation. "Section 301(b) in other words provides the procedural remedy lacking
at common law. Section 301(a) certainly does something more than that." Id. at 451.
21. Id. at 455. Justice Douglas justified this assumption by declaring, "the entire tenor
of the history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that the agreement to arbitrate grievance
disputes was considered as quid pro quo of a no-strike agreement." Id. Yet nowhere in
this history (as appended to Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, 353 U.S. at 485546) is arbitration even mentioned. One of the purposes of this note is to investigate this
hypothesis. See notes 48-56 and accompanying text, infra.

808

Labor Injunctions
legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts
over labor organizations. It expresses, a federal policy that federal
courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained
only in that way.
The emerging central position of the arbitration process within the
framework of this new-found federal policy was further consolidated
in the Steelworkers Trilogy,22 three cases in which the Court held that
arbitration had displaced adjudication as the preferred means for settling labor disputes.
The next controversy concerning the extent of power conferred by
section 301 arose in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 3 wherein the
Court held that Congress had not intended to divest state courts of
concurrent jurisdiction over suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements. 24 But could the state courts continue to apply local
law in such proceedings, while the federal courts were bound to fashion
and apply federal law? The Supreme Court, in Teamsters Local 174 v.
Lucas Flour Co.,25 thought not. In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the
Court emphasized "that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines
of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local
2
rules.) 6
Shortly thereafter, in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,2 7 the longawaited question was presented: did section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act impliedly restrict section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act so as to
permit federal courts to enjoin a strike which breaches a collective
bargaining contract? Justice Black, author of the majority opinion, re-

22. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
23. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
24. Starting "with the premise that nothing in our federal system prevents state
courts from enforcing rights created by federal law," 368 U.S. at 507, Justice Stewart
concluded: "The legislative history makes clear that the basic purpose of § 301(a) was
not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums for the enforcement of contracts
made by labor organizations." Id. at 508.
25. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
26. Id. at 104. The Court reasoned:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under
State and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements.
Id. at 103.
27. 370 US. 195 (1962). See note 6 and accompanying text; supra.
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fused to find. this implication in -section- 301 and concluded that the
question "is one of legislative policy properly within the exclusive domain of Congress .
,,.'
28 But in a strong dissent which was to furnish
the language for the Court's eventual holding in the principal case reversing Sinclair, Justice Brennan argued that since the two statutes do
"coexist" the Court's duty "is to seek out that accommodation of the
two which will give the fullest possible effect to the central purposes of
both. 1)29
In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,30 the stage for Boys Market

was finally set. The Court held that suits which would qualify for federal court jurisdiction under § 301 but which are initially brought in
state courts (whose concurrent jurisdiction was recognized in Dowd
Box) may nevertheless be removed to the designated federal forum.$1
II.

A NEW INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 301

The holding in Avco authorizing removal, coupled with the Court's
refusal in Sinclair to "accommodate" section 4 with section 301, meant
that regardless of the availability of anti-strike injunctions in state
28. 370 U.S. at 214-15. Relying upon two facts the majority concluded that Congress
intended to leave §4 intact. First, since § 301(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly
repealed § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a similar intent with respect to § 4 would
have been made known in a similar manner. Second, the House version of § 301 included an explicit repeal of § 4 which was deleted during the Conference. For an exposition of the legislative history of § 301, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 485-546 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
29. Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 216. Justice Brennan viewed the two reasons advanced by
the majority in support of its conclusion in a different light:
The consequences of repealing the anti-injunction provisions in this context would
have been completely unknowable, and outright repeal, therefore, might well have
seemed unthinkable. Congress, clearly, had no intention of abandoning wholesale the
Norris-LaGuardia policies in contract suits; but it does not follow that § 301 is not
the equal of § 4 in cases which implicate both provisions.
Id. at 223.
30. 390 U.S. 557 (1968). Petitioner had obtained an ex parte injunction from a
Tennessee state court, which was dissolved by the federal district court following removal by respondent. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart observed that it was not
clear whether the district judge dissolved the injunction because he felt that action was
required by Sinclair, and predicted: "[tihe Court will, no doubt, have an opportunity
to reconsider the scope and continuing validity of Sinclair upon an appropriate future
occasion." Id. at 562. Although the principal case does indeed reconsider Sinclair, the
question whether a federal court must dissolve an injunction which it could not have
issued still goes unanswered for an important class of cases-those in which the collective
bargaining agreements contain no-strike clauses but not arbitration provisions. See text
accompanying notes 78-95, infra.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964). This section confers removal jurisdiction upon the
federal courts.
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courts, a union could always insulate its strike activities from judicial
interference by simply removing any state court suit brought against
it to a federal court, which was prohibited by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act from issuing an injunction. In the words of Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Boys Markets:3 2
The principal practical effect of Avco and Sinclairtaken together
is nothing less than to oust state courts of jurisdiction in § 301 (a)
suits where injunctive relief is sought for breach of a no-strike
obligation.
This denial to state courts of jurisdiction over suits for anti-strike
injunction was unacceptable to the Court in Boys Markets for a variety of reasons. It clearly ran afoul of Congress' intent in enacting
section 301, as inferred in Dowd Box, to supplement rather than supplant the pre-existing jurisdiction of state courts."3 Nor was the forethe statuclosure of state remedies the discernibld purpose underlying
tory grant of federal question removal jurisdiction 3 4 Furthermore,
since injunctive relief theoretically remains available in state courts,35
the rule announced in Lucas Flour that federal labor law must prevail
over inconsistent state rules was "seriously offended." 3 6
Refusing to be bound by principles of stare decisis or to interpret
congressional silence as approval of Sindair"7 the Court admitted:"8
32. 398 U.S. at 244-45.
33, 398 U.S. at 245; see Dowd Bvz, 368 US. at 53; see also text accompanying notes
23-24, supra.
34. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 246.
35. Whether state injunctive relief is actually available depends in part upon whether
the state has enacted a "little Norris-LaGuardia Act." See note 77, infra.
36. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 245-46. This assertion by justice Brennan is inconsistent with his interpretation of Congress's intent in enacting § 301. See notes 78-88 and

accompanying text, infra,
37, The dissent argued that the Jnitial interpretation of a statute is unavoidable, but:
"Eiwien the law has been settled by An earlier case then any subsequent 'reinterpretation'

of the statute is gratuitous and neither more nor less than an amendment: it is no
different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that Congress itself placed in the
statute." .Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 257-$8. Only the emergence of new facts or changes

in circumstances warrant the Court's reconsideiing that interpretation. The decision in
Sinclair should stand since the only "subsequent event" was the not-inconsistent Avco
decision. The Sinclair and Avco decisions coexist because (1) jurisdiction and remedy are
separate questions and (2) other redress is available.
Justice Black argued further that since Congress failed to act upon two bills introduced
in1965 to modify the rule in Sinclair, after being invited in that case to do so, it had
indicated "at least a willingness to leave the law as Sinclair had construed it." 398 U.S.
at 259.
38. 398 U.S. at 247. Commentators had differed on whether Sinclair should be over-
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It is undoubtedly true that each of the foregoing objections to
Sinclair-Avco could be remedied either by overruling Sinclair or
by extending that decision to the States.
The Court therefore viewed its alternatives in Boys Markets as either
to overrule Sinclair and allow federal courts as well as state courts to
issue anti-strike injunctions, or to extend Sinclair by prohibiting state
courts as well as federal courts from enjoining strikes.
Three circumstances impelled the majority to overrule rather than
extend Sinclair. First, no evidence indicated that Congress had intended to disenfranchise state courts of the power to grant injunctive
relief in section 301 controversies.3 9 Second, assuming both that remedies short of an injunction are insufficient compensation for an illegal
strike"° and that a no-strike obligation is the quid pro quo for the employer's promise to submit to arbitration:41
Any incentive for employers to enter into such an arrangement
is necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious
method by which the no-strike obligation can be enforced is
eliminated.
Third, to withhold specific performance of a no-strike clause, even
where arbitration clauses are incorporated into collective bargaining
agreements, would defeat the very purpose of arbitration procedures;
i.e., to settle disputes without resort to economic warfare.4
The holding in Boys Markets is, as the Court emphasized, "a nar43
row one."2
We do not undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
We deal only with the situation in which a collective bargaining

ruled or extended to the states. See generally Aaron, Strikes in Breach oj Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLuir. L. R~v. 1027 (1963) (favoring overruling) ; Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia
Marine an the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 Comuim. L. REV. 980 (1969) (favoring
extension to the states).
39. 398 U.S. at 244-45.
40. "While it is of course true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of redress,
such as an action for damages, would remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of
damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an
illegal strike." Id. at 248. Justice Black, in his dissent, agreed but thought the problem
one for Congress. Id. at 261. The majority's belief appears to be widely held. See 23
RUTcERS L. Rav. 569, 572 n.17 (1969).
41. 398 U.S. at 248.
42. Id. at 249.
43. Id. at 253.
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contract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure.
In any action under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, a district
court may not grant injunctive relief against concerted strike activity4 4
unless (1) the dispute is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, (2) the employer is also ordered to arbitrate the dispute, and (3) issuance of the injunction is warranted under the ordinary principles of equity.45
While the result in Boys Markets is vulnerable to- criticism on several scores,4 6 perhaps the subtlest, yet most telling of these is that the
Court's argument itself is incomplete. The dominant rationale advanced in support of "accommodation" was that full fruition of the
basic federal labor policy favoring arbitration will be thwarted so long
as strikes in breach of contract aresheltered from injunction, because
employers are thereby denied a greater incentive to agree to the inclu4
sion of an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining contract. 7
This analysis of the impact of the injunctive threat upon contract negotiations depends for its validity upon the two assumptions discussed
below.

III. THE QUID PRO QUO HYPOTHESIS
Probably no aspect of the Court's argument is more crucial than its
assumption that a union's promise not to strike is the quid pro quo for
44. When the injunction is not directed at strike activity, however, the availability of
equitable relief in federal courts has long been recognized. See note 18, supra. Similiarly,
specific performance of an arbitrator's order to a union to "cease and desist" from striking
may be available in a federal court, even though the effect is identical to that of a
strike injunction. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 389 F.2d 369,
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968). This possibility has prompted the
suggestion that a better solution to the problem presented in the principal case might have
been for the Court to expressly sanction a federal court's specific enforcement of a ceaseand-desist arbitration award following a "speedy" arbitration procedure, because in that
way the Court could have avoided the criticism that it had engaged in a legislative rather
than judicial function. 16 V=. L. REv. 176, 183-84 (1970). However, as Boys Markets
illustrates, a court order is often required before a union will engage in arbitration, as
well as abide by the result. The reprieve granted to striking unions by this two-step
injunction process would appear to make a "speedy" arbitration process an unsatisfactory
solution to the problem in many cases.
45. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253-54.
46. These generally revolve around the legislative character of the decision, with its
attendant deficiency in evaluating the complex array of competing interests and its consequent distortion in the system of checks and balances. See, e.g., Comment, The New
Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YAn U.. 1593 (1970).
47. See note 41 and accompanying text, supra, and notes 6375 and accompanying

text, infra.
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the employer's promise to submit disputes to binding arbitration. 8 Although the result in Boys Markets was buttressed with additional arguments, each of these in turn depends wholly upon the correctness of
the Court's seminal result in Lincoln Mills that federal courts must
fashion and apply federal law in cases brought under section 301. Yet
that result was reached upon precisely the same premise. 9
If the union's promise not to strike is indeed the quid pro quo for
the employer's promise to submit to arbitration, by implication one
promise will not often be found in the absence of the other in a collective bargaining contract. However, a promise by the union not to strike
over a dispute is implied by the court whenever the contract makes
that dispute subject to compulsory and binding arbitration, 0 and thus
a contract which expressly contains an arbitration clause but not a nostrike clause in legal effect contains both. But the reverse is not true;
an arbitration clause must be expressly included. The absence of an
arbitration clause from a contract which does contain a no-strike
clause implies ipso facto that in the negotiation of that contract one
clause was not considered the quid pro quo for the other. By the
Court's hypothesis, contracts of this latter type should be rare.51
Therefore, the frequency of collective bargaining contracts which contain no-strike clauses but not arbitration clauses should provide an index to the validity of the Court's first assumption.

48. "As we have previously indicated, a no strike obligation, express or implied, is the
quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the
process of arbitration." 398 U.S. at 247-48.
49. See note 21 and accompanying text, supra.
50. In Lucas Flour the Court explicitly approved this rule, stating:
In a consistent course of decisions the Courts of Appeals of at least five Federal
Circuits have held that a strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargaining
agreement provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration
constitutes a violation of the agreement. ... We approve that doctrine.
369 U.S. at 105 (footnote omitted).
51. If a substantial percentage of the contracts which contain no-strike clauses were
found to lack arbitration clauses, it is apparent that the consideration for a union's
promise not to strike would often be embodied in covenants by the employer other than
a promise to arbitrate. On the other hand, a low incidence of contracts of this sort would
not of itself prove the quid pro quo hypothesis. The parties may have bargained for each
of the two clauses separately (in conjunction with wage or benefit adjustments, for
example). Although the parties might in this way perceive a value in one clause (measured
by the magnitude of wage adjustment, for instance) different from that in the other, an
extremely low frequency of contracts with no-strike clauses but without arbitration
clauses would nevertheless indicate that the parties are very unwilling to agree to a
contract which contains one clause but not the other.
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The most recent comprehensive study of the correlative 2 incidence
of no-strike and arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements was completed by the United States Department of Labor in
1966. The results may be summarized as follows:
Workers

Contracts

Clause(s)
Neither arbitration nor no-strike
Both arbitration and no-strike
Arbitration without no-strike
No-strike without arbitration

37
1466
143
71

99,100
6,662,100
510,000
167,300

1717

7,438,400

In other words, only 71 contracts out of 1717 contracts studied (or
4.1%o) contained no-strike clauses in the absence of arbitration
52. Similar studies by the Bureau of National Affairs do not include statistics for the
number of agreements which contain no-strike clauses but not arbitration clauses, but
they do provide data on the incidence of each type of clause among all contracts. BNA,
BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS (4th ed., 1957, 5th ed. 1961). These studies utilized
400 contracts statistically and yielded the following results:
PERCENT or ToTAL CONRACTS WnT

SUCH

PRovIoNSs
T

OF PROVISION

Arbitration of grievances
Automatic or permissive initiation of grievance procedure
Submission only by mutual agreement
Unconditional no-strike pledge
Strikes permitted after grievance procedure is exhausted
Strikes permitted if arbitration award is
violated
Strike permitted if contract is violated
Strike permitted in a wage reopening
deadlock
Strike permitted over issues not grievable
or arbitrable
Other
Any of the foregoing conditional promises
With no no-strike provision

1957 study

1961 study

91
81

94

2

3

37
21

48
17

9
4

10
4

18

16

9
6
52
11

5
7
46
6

53. US. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL.

Nos.

1425-26, ARBITRA-

TION PROCEDURES (1966). The statistics cited in the accompanying text were taken from

Table 8 of this study. The agreements studied were in force during 1961-1962.
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clauses.54 Strictly speaking, at least these 71 agreements are the product of negotiations in which, contrary to the Court's hypothesis, the
union's promise not to strike was not the quid pro quo for a promise by
the employer to arbitrate grievances. However, 57 of these 71 contracts permitted strikes after the exhaustion of the grievance procedure. If an absolute strike ban is the quid pro quo for a binding arbitration provision, as the Court asserts, then it might be said with
equal validity that a temporary strike ban bears a similar relation to a
provision for ordinary grievance procedures. These 57 agreements
therefore do no damage to the Court's assumption. Only the remaining
14 contracts (or 0.8% of all contracts studied) stand as counterexamples to the quid pro quo hypothesis. 6
IV.

A UNION'S DILEMMA

The Court's second assumption in Boys Markets, if indeed its purpose was to promote the arbitration of disputes, was implicit: a union
values an arbitration clause more highly than immunity from antistrike injunctions. This premise is required by the narrowness of the
holding, which does not permit federal courts to enjoin strike activity
unless the dispute is subject to arbitration.;" Although the holding
does encourage the employer to offer an arbitration agreement, it also
discourages the union from accepting one, since acceptance would end
the union's immunity to anti-strike injunctions. The Court did not balance these countereffects, noting only the incentive to the employer."
If the federal policy favoring arbitration was determinative of the
holding in Boys Markets, the Court must have assumed that unions
would nevertheless desire an arbitration clause.

54. Although not all of these 71 contracts are counter-examples of the Court's assumption, all are nevertheless beyond the reach of the holding in Boys Markets, since they
prohibit strikes (although often to only a limited extent) which are not subject to compulsory and binding arbitration. These 71 contracts alone govern some 167,300 employees,
and together with all other contracts of this category which were not analyzed they are
the subject of notes 78-95 and accompanying text, infra.
55. Note 54, supra.
56. Of these 14 agreements, 9 imposed an absolute strike ban, 2 prohibited strikes over
issues subject to the grievance procedure, 2 lifted the strike ban if the agreement was
violated, and 1 imposed an unstated condition.
57. See note 47, supra.
58. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text, supra.
59. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248.
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Such an assumption may be invalid. The result of Boys Markets is
to increase the price which a union must pay for an arbitration clause,
possibly beyond that which the employer's bargaining power is able to
command. Suppose that an employer proposes a new contract which
includes an arbitration provision, knowing that a no-strike obligation
is implied60 which may be enforced by injunction as a result of the
holding in Boys Markets.6 The union is then faced with the dilemma
of forsaking either arbitration or strikes. The union may conclude that
the arbitration process is potentially the more beneficial, and accept
the proposed clause. In this event the Court's avowed goal of promoting arbitration is realized. But the union may decide that strikes (and
meaningful threats of strikes) would be of greater advantage, and accordingly resist the employer's offer. If the employer's bargaining
strength is not sufficient to overcome the union's resistance, the holding in Boys Markets will backfire--the arbitration process will be rejected. This inhibitory effect of the holding on the use of arbitration
must be balanced against the expansive effect attributable to employers' newly-added incentive to consent to an arbitration clause. The net
effect is not predictable with certainty.
Since the Court surely appreciated the complex effects of its holding in Boys Markets upon the use of arbitration as a means for settling
labor disputes, it has demonstrated a willingness, discussed in the fol-

60. See note 50, supra.
61. Another reason why an arbitration clause may be desirable from the employer's
standpoint, not considered by the Court in Boys Markets, is that it may be drafted so
that either side may invoke the arbitration process. The arbitration clause in the principal
case, for example, was of this type. See note 2, supra. The Labor Department study, cited
in note 53, supra, disclosed that of the 1,609 agreements studied which contained provision
for arbitration of some or all disputes, 1,445 could be invoked by either party, 46 by
the aggrieved party, 46 by mutual consent, and only 72 by the union alone. In other
words, 1,537 (or 95.5%) of the arbitration clauses were of potential benefit to the
employer as well as the union.
For a discussion of situations in which the employer, rather than the union, might
profitably invoke the arbitration clause see Comment, Use of an Arbitration Clause, 41
InD. L.J. 455 (1966). It might be used, for example, to gain a stay of National Labor
Relations Board action, a dismissal of the charges before the Board, or, on appeal to a
federal court, to secure a reversal of an adverse Board decision.
Unions may welcome arbitration clauses which are invocable by either party (which
may account for their prevalence) because then the employer's breach-of-contract claims
are kept out of the courts. In Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), the
Court held that the district court properly denied, the union's motion to dismiss the
employer's claim for damages against the union, because the arbitration clause under
which the union contended the dispute should be settled included the express limitation
that arbitration boards should consider only employee grievances.
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lowing section, to subordinate this "kingpin of federal labor policy
to the realization of other overriding national priorities.

'6 2

V. INTIMATIONS OF A RE-ORDERING
OF NATIONAL LABOR PRIORITIES
"The Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive to a situation totally
different from that which exists today."6 8 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority in Boys Markets, continued: 64
As labor organizations grew in strength and developed toward maturity, congressional emphasis shifted from protection of
the nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective
bargaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes. This shift in emphasis was accomplished, however, without extensive revision of many of the older
enactments, including the anti-injunction section of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Thus it became the task of the courts to accommodate, to reconcile the older statutes with the more recent ones.
As an example of this accommodation process, the Court cited Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R.,65 wherein the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was held not to bar a federal court from enjoining a strike waged in violation of the statutory duty to arbitrate imposed by the Railway Labor Act.6 6 The majority in Boys Markets further reasoned that not only is the Norris-LaGuardia Act no barrier to
the reversal of Sinclair,but its goal, "to foster the growth and viability
of labor organizations," T is in fact promoted by requiring a union to
62. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962). Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sinclair, pointed out:
Ironically, state rather than federal courts will be the preferred instruments to
protect the integrity of the arbitration process, which Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers decisions forged into a kingpin of federal labor policy.

Id.
63. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 250.
64. Id. at 251.
65. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
66. 45 U.S.C. § 153(i), (m) (1964).
67. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 252. Differing characterizations were submitted by the
litigants as to the purpose of the Act. Petitioner contended:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was adopted by Congress in 1932 in response to the use of
the injunctive powers of the federal courts to thwart organizing efforts of unions.
The principal purposes sought to be accomplished by the Norris-LaGuardia Act
were to outlaw "yellow dog" contracts and to prohibit the use of injunctions as a
weapon against labor's efforts to organize employees.
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submit disputes to the impartial tribunal it freely agreed to establish
for that purpose. Justice Brennan summarized: 6"
We conclude, therefore, that the unavailability of equitable relief
in the arbitration context presents a serious impediment to the
congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a
mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes ....
Three related, but mutually-distinguishable, labor policies are discernible from the Court's discussion, each of which is calculated to advance the general welfare: (1) the parties should decide for themselves the scope of their obligations during the term of the contract,
and the courts would simply require the parties to live up to the obligations they freely undertook; (2) the arbitration mechanism, rather
than the courts, should have primary responsibility for the resolution
of labor disputes; and (3) social disruption should be reduced by restricting the class of strikes which are protected from injunction.6 9
The Court rested its holding in Boys Markets ostensibly upon the
second of these policies. 70 Yet it is at least questionable that the holding will bolster the arbitration process. 71 Also, arbitration has flourished even without the aid of federal court injunctions,7 2 while strikes

Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
The AFL-CIO, on the other hand, as amicas curiae, argued:
We start from the position that the fundamentals of Norris-LaGuardia and the federal
law of labor arbitration are basically consistent. The premise of both is that the
judiciary is unsuited to the task of setting the basic substantive rules which govern
the conduct of the parties to a labor dispute, and that the public interest is best
served by the utilization of methods of dispute settlement other than litigation.
Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 3, The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, (1970).
The dissenting Justices adhered to the interpretation of congressional intent reached by
the majority in Sinclair.
68. 398 US. at 253 (emphasis added).
69. While these policies do coincide in many respects, e.g., a voluntary promise to
utilize the arbitration mechanism doubtless reduces the risk of socially-disruptive strikes,
each of the first two of these policies has a value independent of that of the third. The
policy favoring voluntary delimitation of permissible conduct during the term of the
agreement, which entrusts the negotiation of a socially-beneficial agreement to a parity
of bargaining power between the parties, serves to promote self-reliance and to protect
the integrity of contracts. The preference for arbitration rather than litigation as a means
for settling labor disputes seeks not only to avoid strikes but also to secure to the parties
all of the advantages of arbitration-including speed, economy, and flexibility-even in
the frequent situations where a strike is not a realistic alternative.
70. See text accompanying note 41, supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 57-61, supra.
72. "The proportion of agreements providing for grievance arbitration reflects a steady
increase in prevalence. In 1944, 1949, and 1952 Bureau studies, arbitration provisions
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during the term of the agreement continue at a comparatively high
rate. These considerations suggest that the federal policy favoring
arbitration was not so much in need of vindication as was the right of
the employer to the benefit of his bargain. In short, the Court seems to
be willing to risk subordinating the promotion of arbitration, if necessary, to the reduction of strike activity.
A full-scale pursuit of the first and third national labor policies outlined above, to the possible detriment of the federal interest in arbitration, would lead the Court to permit a lower federal court to enjoin
any strike waged in violation of a no-strike clause, regardless of the arbitrability of the underlying dispute. 74 But the result in Boys Markets
has been criticized as a judicial usurpation of legislative prerogative. 75
To expand its holding to reach strikes which breach contracts lacking
arbitration provisions would be even more properly a legislative decision, because the policy favoring arbitration could not be invoked by
the Court as it was in Boys Markets. The doctrine of separation of
powers may well prove an insurmountable barrier to further judicial
"accommodation" between section 4 and section 301.
Federal courts remain constrained by the Norris-LaGuardia Act
from granting injunctive relief in suits for the breach of no-strike
clauses in contracts lacking arbitration provisions. Although only approximately four percent of all collective bargaining contracts in the
United States are within this category, the encompassed labor force is

were found in 73, 83, and 89 percent of the agreements, respectively." LABOR BULL. Nos.
1925-26, ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 5 (1966). Arbitration clauses were included in almost
95% of contracts in effect in 1961-62. But perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence
that the Sinclair decision dampened this trend.
Strike bans are becoming more frequent, also, but at a more moderate rate. A 1952 study
showed 12% of the collective bargaining contracts studied lacked strike bans of any sort,
compared with only 10.5% in the 1966 study. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DFP'T
or LABOR, BULL No. 1091, CONTRACT PROVISIONS, 1950-51 (1952).
A recent survey of contracts in force in 1965 showed that only 7% failed to contain a
no-strike clause of either the absolute or conditional type. BNA LRX 97.
73. In 1961, 32.2% of 3,367 work stoppages involving 1,450,000 workers occurred
during the term of the agreement. In 1965, 34.7% of 3,963 work stoppages involving
1,550,000 workers occurred during the term of the agreement. In 1968, 31.4% of 5,045
work stoppages involving 2,649,000 workers occurred during the term of the agreement.
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1611, ANALYSIS OF WORK
STOPPAGES, 1967, 2, 8 (1969); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL.
No. 1646, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES, 1968, 4 (1970).
74. There is some reason to believe the Court intends to extend Boys Markets this
far. See text accompanying notes 89-96, inlra.
75. See notes 37 and 46, supra.
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not insignificant.76 Two questions remain unanswered. May a state
court enjoin a strike which violates a contract under which the dispute
is not subject to arbitration, even though a federal court cannot?7 7 If
so, may a federal court exercising removal jurisdiction enforce a state

court's preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order which it
could not itself have issued? These questions are discussed in the fol-

lowing two sections.
VI.

THE IMPLICATION FOR STATE COURTS

In support of the conclusion in Boys Markets that Sinclair should

be either overruled or extended to the states,7 Justice Brennan asserted that79
to the extent that widely disparate remedies theoretically remain
available in state, as opposed to federal, courts, the federal policy

of labor law uniformity elaborated in Lucas Flour Co. is seriously
offended.
The reason for uniformity is to aid the parties in the negotiation and

administration of collective bargaining agreements by ensuring that
individual contract terms do not have different meanings under state
and federal law."0 In Lucas Flour, however, the Court declared:"'

76. See note 54, supra.
77. A parallel issue not discussed in this note concerns the twenty-five states which
have "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" presently in force. Fifteen of these states prohibit their
courts from enjoining even those strikes which are in breach of no-strike clauses. See
Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia Marine
on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 CoLurr. L. Rnv. 980 (1968). Since a federal
court is now empowered to enjoin such strikes, does the uniformity doctrine of Lucas
Flour require that state courts have equal freedom? An affirmative answer to this question was reached by one commentator, predicated upon an "outcome-determinative"
distinction between substance and procedure. Comment, The New Federal Law of Labor
Injunction, 79 YALE LJ. 1593 (1970). But see notes 84-88 and accompanying text, infra.
78. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text, supra.
79. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 245-46. Although the Court decided against extending
Sinclair to the states, it does not immediately follow that the states are free to enjoin
strikes. The holding in Sinclair applied to all union promises not to strike, but was overruled by Boys Markets only insofar as it applied to strikes over disputes subject to
arbitration. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text, supra. Consequently, in all other cases,
the questions left unanswered by Sinclair remain undecided under Boys Markets.
80. See note 26 and accompanying text, supra. One consequence of a disparity in
meaning between state and federal law, according to the Court in Boys Markets, is that
it will "produce rampant forum-shopping and maneuvering from one court to another...."
Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 246. But one commentator contends that the concurrent
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The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive
principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute.
A distinction might arguably be drawn between "substantive principles" and the "remedy" which follows their application, thereby allowing each state to decide for itself whether its courts may enjoin strikes.
A similar distinction was successfully maintained in UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp. 2 Affirming the dismissal of a suit brought in federal
district court by a union after the state's statute of limitations had run,
the Court stated:8 3
The need for uniformity, then, is greatest where its absence would
threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual processes
that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote-the formation of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it. For the most part, statutes of limitations come into
play only when these processes have already broken down. Lack
of uniformity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any
important way the achievement of any significant goal of labor
policy.
The Court therefore held that the timeliness of a section 301 suit is
governed, as a matter of FEDERAL law, by the forum state's statute
of limitations.8 4 If this argument is accepted, then the Lucas Flour
uniformity doctrine does not support the Court's result.
But are an injunction and a state statute of limitations really equivalent in this respect? Certainly if a promise is specifically enforceable
that promise becomes more precious;" it can command greater value
in consideration from the promisee during the negotiation of the contract, and greater fidelity from the promisor during its administration.
On the other hand, a reasonable period of time within which suit must
be brought following the violation of a contract can hardly be said to
existence of conflicting remedies in the state and federal courts, even with consequent
forum-shopping, is not detrimental to the welfare of the parties. Wellington, Labor and
the Federal System, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 542, 558-59 (1959).

81. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962)
added).
82. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
83. Id. at 702.
84. Id. at 704-0.
85. See note 40, suPra.
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significantly affect the negotiation or administration of the agreement.
These considerations suggest that the uniformity doctrine of Lucas
Flour does indeed embrace the availability of injunctive relief36
Were there no further reference in the principal case to the question,
it would seem that Justice Brennan was laying the groundwork for the
Court, in an appropriate section 301 case, to prohibit the states from
issuing any injunction which is not also in the federal arsenal. However, only two paragraphs after he had relied on Lucas Flour, the ma7
jority's spokesman declared:
[W]e agree with Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court that "whether or not Congress could deprive state courts of
the power to give such [injunctive] remedies when enforcing collective bargaining agreements, it has not attempted to do so either
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act or section 301." McCarroll v. Los
Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 61,
315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
But the result in Lucas Flour was predicated upon the inferred intent
of Congress. 8 If Congress did not intend to restrict a state court's

86. This was essentially the argument made in Shaw Electric Co. v. IBEW Local 98,
418 Pa. 1, 208 A.2d 769 (1965). The court stated:
Nor do the policies underlying the Supreme Court's decision in [Lucas Flour] require
the anti-injunction restriction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to be read as a limitation
on state proceedings. In holding that Section 301 mandates the use of substantive
principles of federal labor law, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of
uniformity in the interpretation of contractual provisions as the rationale for its
conclusion. However, different meanings with respect to the same contractual terms
would not result from the exercise of the historic state judicial power to grant injunctive remedies. Surely, the interpretation of contractual clauses does not hinge on
the form of relief to be granted.
208 A.2d at 774-75 (footnotes omitted).
A somewhat similar conclusion was reached in Lesnick, State-Court Injunctions and
the Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: Beyond Norris-LaGuardia,79 HAnv. L.
Ry. 757 (1966). Rejecting a definitional approach to the question of whether section 301
incorporates section 4, the author argues that the outcome should depend upon a "balance
to be struck between the need to vindicate rights through specific performance and the
dangers to protected concerted activities of permitting equity to excercise its power too
close by." Id. at 760. "Of course Norris-LaGuardia is 'federal law' and 'federal law'
controls. But to settle the question so simply comes dose to adjudication by pun." Id. at
758. Also, "itseems clear that the conditions governing the availability of injunctive
relief should not be regarded as 'procedural' for the purpose of deciding the choice of
governing law." Id. at 760. For example, under Lesnick's scheme an ex parte restraining
order would be prohibited to the states, but a preliminary injunction would be available.
87. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 247. In the McCarroll case cited by the Court, the
California Supreme Court affirmed an order granting a preliminary injunction against a
strike waged in breach of a no-strike obligation in the collective bargaining agreement.
88. See note 26 and accompanying text, supra.

823

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 805, 1971

choice of remedies to those available to a federal court, there is therefore no present basis for the Court to do so. The Court's acceptance of
Chief Justice Traynor's interpretation appears likely to preclude the
extension of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the states."9
VII. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS AFTER REMOVAL:
BOY'S MARKETS EXTENDED?
A section 301 suit initially brought in a state court may be removed
to the designated federal forum.9° If the state court had issued a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order barring a strike
staged in violation of a collective agreement under which the dispute
was not subject to arbitration, must the federal court dissolve the injunction? This question, expressly reserved in Avco, 91 was squarely
presented in General Electric Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 191,92
wherein the court of appeals affirmed the dissolution of a state court's
ex parte injunction by a federal district court because9"
a failure to dissolve the state court injunction would have been
tantamount to issuance of that same injunction by the federal district court....
The judgment was rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Boys Markets, but it was in full accord with that eventual holding
because the parties had stipulated that the controversy involved was
not subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining contract and
that the applicable grievance procedure had been exhausted.9 4 Yet the
Supreme Court granted certiorari 5 and in a memorandum opinion
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case

89. But see Comment, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J.
1593, 1615 (1970). The differing result was again based on the substance-procedure
dichotomy. This fails to recognize the significance of the Court's explicit acceptance of
Justice Traynor's conclusion, which signals the Court's willingness to apply the uniformity
doctrine not on the basis of often artificial distinctions between substance and procedure
but rather according to its issue-by-issue impression of the congressional intent.
90. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
91. Id. at 561 & n.4.
92. 413 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1969).
93. Id. at 966.
94. Id. at 965.
95. 398 U.S. 436 (1970).
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"for further consideration in 'light of Boys Markets v. Retdil Clerk's
Union ....9b
There can be no doubt that this injunction could not, consistently
with Boys Markets, be issued in the first instance by a federal court.
Unless a federal court may enforce a preliminary injunction which it
could not have issued,0 7 the reversal suggests that injunctive enforcement of the collective agreement was proper even though the underlying dispute was not subject to arbitration, 8 and therefore may indicate
a willingness to extend Boys Markets to reach the breach of any no
strike clause.
CONCLUSION
A federal court may now enjoin a strike which violates a collective
bargaining agreement if, but only if, the precipitative dispute is subject to arbitration. The new rule is not certain to produce the positive
effect upon the use of arbitration postulated in the principal case, due
to the increased price which a union must pay in securing an arbitration clause. That price is an end to immunity to anti-strike injunctions.
The Court's failure to account for this inhibitory effect on unions suggests that the policy favoring arbitration must yield, if necessary, to
policies directed toward a reduction in the volume of strike activity
through literal enforcement of collective bargaining contracts. Although such re-ordered national labor priorities would be served by
giving federal courts free rein in injunctively enforcing all no-strike
obligations regardless of arbitrability, this step is properly within the
exclusive discretion of Congress. A corollary to the holding in Boys
Markets which further revitalizes the labor injunction may well be judicially advanced without legislative intervention: a state court is not
96. Id.
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1964). It provides in part:
All injunctions, orders, and other proceedings bad in such action prior to its removal
shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district
court.
Section 1450 is part of the general removal statute and its application in the ordinary
diversity or federal question removal is entirely reasonable. In the General Electric
situation, however, where the federal district court is prohibited from issuing an injunction by the Norris-LuGuardia Act, its impact is open to doubt.
98. That the Court's disposition of the General Electric case went beyond what Boys
Markets required is further demonstrated by Justice Douglas' concurrence in Boys
Markets and dissent in General Electric.
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prohibited by federal law from enjoining strikes which breach collective bargaining agreements of any sort. While strikes during contract
negotiations remain an urgent national problem, a vigorous blow has
been struck against instability in labor-management relations during
the term of the agreement.
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